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I. INTRODUCTION
"'.-* iscrimination' ... is in general a failure to treat all persons
LJ equally where no reasonable distinction can be found between
those favored and those not favored."1 Discrimination in employment is
particularly invidious because it denies equal employment opportunities
to those who are similarly situated. Congress has prohibited discrimina-
tion in employment by enacting Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,2
which makes a practice unlawful where it differentiates "because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... ,,3 Seniority
* The author wishes to acknowledge the conscientious assistance of Dean M. Rooney,
Esq.
, Baker v. California Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235, 238 (C.D. Cal. 1972), affd, 507
F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). The full text of this section sets out the general principles of
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systems are practices that have the potential to discriminate unlawfully
where lines of progression are based on discriminatory grounds. However,
Congress sought to protect bona fide seniority systems by enacting sec-
tion 703(h) of the Act." The relevant part of section 703(h) states:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer 5 to apply different standards of compensation, or different
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona
fide seniority or merit system . . . provided that such differences
are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin . .. .
The inclusion of this section reflects the importance of seniority systems
to all who work.
7
Seniority relates to length of employment. A seniority system is a
scheme or plan which gives increased rights or benefits to employees as
their length of employment increases s Different methods of measuring
Title VII:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(h).
"Employer" is a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce, with 15 or more
employees, for 20 or more calendar weeks in the year. Id. § 2000e(b).
O Id. § 2000e-2(h). The complete text of this section reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of com-
pensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to
a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations,
provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any
professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or
action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It shall not be an unlawful employ-
ment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the
basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be
paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the
provisions of § 206(d) of title 29.
See generally Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Senior-
ity Rights, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1532 (1962) (discusses the importance of seniority in the labor
movement, and the history of seniority systems).
' California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 606, reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 973
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seniority are utilized by employers. Seniority may be measured solely by
length of employment at a company, or by length of employment within a
particular department or job.9 The most important purpose of seniority
systems is the maintenance of a stable work force through realistic em-
ployee expectations. These systems play a significant role in collective
bargaining and union decision-making.10 Therefore, section 703(h) was
passed as an exemption to Title VII, in order to protect bona fide systems
of seniority.
When Title VII was enacted, there was a clear need to protect seniority
systems. But, since passage of the Act, the scope of the protection has
been the subject of interpretational difficulties. The exemption embodied
in section 703(h) is limited to "bona fide" seniority systems, but neither
the legislative history nor the courts have defined the meaning of "bona
fide."
The purpose of Title VII was "the prevention of unlawful employment
discrimination and the amelioration and elimination of the effects of past
discrimination."11 To this end, the courts historically have looked at the
"effects" of discrimination rather than the "intent" to discriminate, when
analyzing a Title VII violation. 2 Yet recently, the Supreme Court, in
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson," has required a showing of intent to
discriminate in the operation of a seniority system in order to prove that
it is outside the section 703(h) exemption to Title VII.1"
The American Tobacco decision also extended section 703(h)'s protec-
tion to post-Act seniority systems." Prior to this decision, the courts held
that section 703(h) protected only seniority systems in effect prior to the
effective date of Title VII."
In order to understand fully the ramifications of this recent Supreme
(1979); Aaron, supra note 7, at 1533. "Seniority rights depend upon an employer-employee
relationship; they do not guarantee such a relationship but merely define the rights of an
employee when that status is in existence ...." Local Lodge 2040, Int'l Ass'n of Machin-
ists v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692, 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
' Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1602
(1969) (The authors of this article were counsel for employees in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), and other cases regarding § 703(h)).
1* Id. at 1605. See also Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 346 (1964) (Seniority "has
become of overriding importance, and one of its major functions is to determine who gets or
who keeps an available job.").
11 THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF AT-
TORNEY GENERAL, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: AN OVERVIEW OF LEGAL ISSUES 11
(1976) [hereinafter cited as OVERVIw OF LEGAL ISSUES].
" Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971).
" 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
" Id. at 70.
"8 Id. at 68-69.
" See Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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Court decision and its effect on section 703(h), the legislative history and
the Court's interpretation of the legislative history must be considered.
This Note will trace the history of section 703(h) through Congress and
the courts, and will ultimately show the negative effects that the Ameri-
can Tobacco decision will have on challenges to seniority systems. In this
decision, the Court broadened the scope of 703(h) without defining the
term "bona fide" system. The Court therefore has erected new barriers
that now face employees challenging seniority systems under Title VII,
and left employers and unions without definitive guidelines detailing
their duties to bargain collectively on the issue of seniority systems.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. Title VII, Generally"7
In the 1960's, civil rights were at the forefront of political and social
concern. This concern was a culmination of a history of controversies sur-
rounding social inequality. Minorities were equal according to the law,
yet, in effect, they were accorded the rank of second-class citizens. Civil
rights progress was the major plank in the political platforms of both the
Democratic and Republican parties in 1960.8 The emphasis was on equal
access and equal opportunity. 9 In February, 1963, President Kennedy
pronounced:
[Rlace discrimination hampers our economic growth by prevent-
ing the maximum development of our manpower, by contra-
dicting at home the message we preach abroad. It mars the atmo-
sphere of a united and classless society in which this Nation rose
to greatness. It increases the cost of public welfare, crime, delin-
quency, and disorder. Above all, it is wrong.20
It was not until five months later, however, that President Kennedy pro-
moted federal legislation in the area of civil rights, and particularly em-
ployment discrimination. He stressed three areas that needed progress in
" The first attempt at fair employment practices legislation occurred in 1941 with the
introduction of H.R. 3994. It was entitled "A Bill to Prohibit Discrimination by Any Agency
Supported in Whole or in Part with Funds Appropriated by the Congress of the United
States, and to Prohibit Discrimination Against Persons Employed or Seeking Employment
on Government Contracts Because of Race, Color or Creed." This bill and hundreds of
others died in committee or by Senate filibuster. By 1957, pressure for federal legislation in
the area of employment discrimination was great. This pressure led the way toward passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. REV. 431, 431-32 (1966).
" 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 2362.
19 Id.
20 109 CONG. REc. 3245 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 2368
(Message of President John F. Kennedy, February 28, 1963; this was his first special mes-
sage to Congress on civil rights legislation).
[Vol. 32:607
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order to alleviate the position of minority workers and the minority un-
employed. Progress would be attained by "creating more jobs through
greater economic growth, raising the level of skills through more educa-
tion and training and eliminating racial discrimination in employment."2
Thus the stage was set for passage of H.R. 7125, later known as the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,22 and its Title VII, which dealt specifically with em-
ployment discrimination.
The broad purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was to ensure
equal employment opportunity through the use of formal and informal
remedial measures. Specifically, the goal of Title VII was to "eliminate
those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citi-
zens" 2 -- in other words, to remove the "barriers" to equality.24 As origi-
nally passed, the Act prohibited discrimination by employers,2 5 employ-
ment agencies, 26 and labor organizations. 27 The 1972 amendments to Title
VII expanded the prohibitions to include discrimination by state, county,
and municipal governments.2 8
When Title VII was first enacted, it was thought that the Act would
provide clear guidance for the courts. Although Title VII was the result of
many concessions reached during Senate debates, the prevalent thought
was that these debates further clarified the purpose of the law. "Seldom
has similar legislation been debated with greater . . . care in the making
2, 109 CONG. REC. 11, 174 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2392
(President Kennedy's message to Congress, June 19, 1963). See also Vaas, supra note 17, at
432.
22 109 CONG. REC. 11, 252 (1963). A Judiciary subcommittee conducted hearings on 172
bills related to many civil rights issues. Finally, on June 20, 1963, H.R. 7152 was proposed
by Representative Celler of New York. It was a more comprehensive bill than those previ-
ously suggested, and contained eleven titles concerning voting rights, desegregation of public
education, creation of the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and more.
See generally Vaas, supra note 17, at 434-35.
23 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (discusses Title VII in
the context of a discharge for alleged racially discriminatory motives). See also Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1977) ("Similarly situated employees are not
to be treated differently solely because they differ with respect to race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975); Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429
(1971); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 458
F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235, 238 (3d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975) ("The primary purpose of Title VII is to protect
minorities from economic oppression."); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505
(E.D. Va. 1968).
'4 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
2 Id. § 2000e-2(b).
17 Id. § 2000e-2(c).
22 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
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thereof, to guide the courts in interpreting and applying the law."'2 9 Un-
fortunately, the subsequent decisional history exemplifies some of the
shortcomings of Title VII. The Act does not provide a definitive list of
what constitutes an unlawful employment practice. Thus, courts were left
with the responsibility for defining the meaning of unlawful discrimina-
tion within the Act.30 Further, Title VII does not fully address the fact
that overt, intentional discrimination is not the only impediment to equal
employment opportunities. "[P]ractices, procedures, or tests neutral on
their face, and even neutral in terms of intent"3 1 have been shown to have
a discriminatory effect and have been deemed unlawful by the Court.
B. Section 703(h)
Interpretational difficulties regarding the section 703(h) exemption
have proved even more serious than the affirmative provisions of Title
VII. When the initial draft of the Act passed the full House on Febru-
ary 10, 1964, section 703(h) and its seniority provisions were not part of
the Act.3 2 The first opposition to Title VII based on its effect on seniority
systems is found in a House minority report.3 s The authors of the report
stated that "[tihe provisions of this Act grant the power to destroy
union seniority."3 They further explained that to destroy seniority is to
destroy unionism, and to "millions of working men and women, union
membership is the most valuable asset they own."' 5 Their fear included
concern that unions would lose their power to bargain collectively, and
that they would have to pass over qualified white employees with more
seniority in favor of less-qualified, low-seniority minorities. 6 This fear of
the demise of seniority systems did not generate congressional debate un-
til the bill reached the Senate.
H.R. 7152 was introduced in the Senate on February 17, 1964.23 Pro-
ponents of the bill took many measures to assure its passage, including
the formation of bipartisan groups to lead discussion and debate.3 8 As a
"' Vaas, supra note 17, at 444.
30 See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (racial discrimination in testing); United States
v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973) (racial discrimination in seniority). See also
Rothschild & Werden, Title VII and the Use of Employment Tests: An Illustration of the
Limits of the Judicial Process, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 261-62 (1982).
N See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 ("Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the conse-
quences of employment practices, not simply motivation.") (emphasis in original).
32 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964).
33 E.E. Willis, E.L. Forrester, Win. M. Tuck, Robert T. Ashmore, John Dawdy & Basil L.
Whitener, MINORITY REPORT UPON PROPOSED CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1963, COMMITTEE ON JUDI-
CIARY SUBSTITUTE FOR H.R. 7152, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 2431.
Id. at 2440 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 2439-40.
s Id. at 2440.
37 110 CONG. REc. 2882. See also Vaas, supra note 17, at 443.
" Vaas, supra note 17, at 444-45. This bipartisan support for H.R. 7152 is illustrated by
[Vol. 32:607
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result of this bipartisan effort, Senators Dirksen, Mansfield, Humphrey,
and Kuchel presented the Mansfield-Dirksen amendment as a substitute
for the entire bill. 9 Another substitute bill was presented by the same
senators, but its provisions concerning Title VII were substantially the
same as in the original substitute. On June 19, 1964, during Senate clo-
ture, the amended version of Title VII passed the full Senate.4 0 It is the
Mansfield-Dirksen amendment that added, inter alia, subsection (h) to
section 703 of Title VII.
Section 703(h) was included in Title VII in response to views expressed
during Senate debate that compliance with Title VII would interfere with
seniority systems. On April 8, 1964, Senator Clark introduced interpre-
tive memoranda explaining that Title VII would not destroy existing se-
niority systems. One memorandum stated: "Title VII would have no ef-
fect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospective and not
retrospective. '41 This memorandum has been the subject of much discus-
sion by the courts and originally was afforded great weight in their inter-
pretation of 703(h). 2 However, in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,
the Supreme Court, for the first time, stated that no weight is to be given
to the legislative history and that the "plain language" of the subsection
is all that is to be considered.4 s The Court also did not give deference to a
Senators Humphrey and Kuchel (majority and minority whips, respectively) who authored a
daily newsletter entitled "Bipartisan Civil Rights Newsletter." The newsletter was given to
all proponents of the bill and was entered daily in the Congressional Record to ensure con-
tinued, informed support.
'9 110 CONG. REc. 11936 (Senate Amendment No. 656). According to Senator Dirksen: "I
doubt very much whether in my whole legislative lifetime any measure has received so much
meticulous attention. We have tried to be mindful of every word, of every comma, and of
the shading of every phrase." 110 CONG. REC. 11935.
o Vaas, supra note 17, at 446. This bill was passed by a vote of 73 to 27, with every
senator present and voting. 110 CONG. REC. 14511. It was signed into law by the President of
the United States on July 2, 1964. 110 CONG. REC. 14783 (1964).
41 The text of the memorandum relevant to seniority systems is as follows:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is prospec-
tive and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminat-
ing in the past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the title comes
into effect, the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a
nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed permitted-to fire
whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once
Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white
workers hired earlier. (However, where waiting lists for employment or training
are, prior to the effective date of the title, maintained on a discriminatory basis,
the use of such lists after the title takes effect may be held an unlawful subterfuge
to accomplish discrimination).
110 CONG. REC. 7212-15 (1964). See also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 759
n.15 (1975); Cooper & Sobol, supra note 9, at 1610 n.40.
4 See generally Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1975).
4 American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. at 68. "On its face § 703(h) makes no
distinction between pre- and post-Act seniority systems . . . ." Id. at 69.
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Justice Department statement that Senator Clark included in the Con-
gressional Record that read: "[I]t has been asserted that Title VII would
undermine vested rights of seniority. This is not correct. Title VII would
have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect.""
To clarify the meaning of Title VII further, Senator Clark entered in
the Congressional Record questions answered by Senator Dirksen regard-
ing seniority. One response to a question concerning labor contracts
which call for a "last hired, first fired" system, was that
[s]eniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a
"last hired, first fired" agreement a Negro happens to be the "last
hired," he can still be "first fired" as long as it is done because of
his status as "last hired" and not because of his race.45
During debate on the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute amendment, Sena-
tor Humphrey (one of the drafters of the seniority exemption) stated that
section 703(h) "merely clarifies [the] present intent and effect" of Title
VII.4s Thus, it was not meant to alter the basic meaning and purpose of
Title VII. Yet cohesive legislative materials are lacking because the pro-
ponents of the bill in the Senate managed to bring it to the Senate floor
without its first going through committee. "' Therefore, there is no Senate
committee report to resolve interpretational difficulties. But it would
seem from the Congressional Record that the emphasis was on protecting
44 The full text relevant to seniority is as follows:
First, it has been asserted that Title VII would undermine vested rights of se-
niority. This is not correct. Title VII would have no future effect on seniority
rights existing at the time it takes effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining
contract provides that in the event of layoffs, those who were hired last must be
laid off first, such a provision would not be affected in the least by [T]itle VII.
This would be true even in the case where owing to discrimination prior to the
effective date of the title, white workers had more seniority than Negroes. Title
VII is directed at discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. It is perfectly clear that when a worker is laid off or denied a chance for
promotion because under established seniority rules he is "low man on the totem
pole" he is not being discriminated against because of his race. Of course, if the
seniority rule itself is discriminatory, it would be unlawful under [T]itle VII. If a
rule were to state that all Negroes must be laid off before any white man, such a
rule could not serve as the basis for a discharge subsequent to the effective date of
the title. I do not know how anyone could quarrel with such a result. But, in the
ordinary case, assuming that seniority rights were built up over a period of time
during which Negroes were not hired, these rights would not be set aside by the
taking effect of [T]itle VII. Employers and labor organization would simply be
under a duty not to discriminate against Negroes because of their race. Any differ-
ences in treatment based on established seniority rights would not be based on
race and would not be forbidden by the title.
110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964).
• 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964).
46 Id. at 12723.
See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 9, at 1609; Vaas, supra note 17, at 443-44 and 457-58.
[Vol. 32:607
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seniority systems which were already in effect, from the provisions of Ti-
tle VII. It is less clear whether seniority systems created after passage of
the Act would also be exempted from Title VII compliance.
To exempt systems created after passage of the Act would ignore the
essential purpose of Title VII. An exception in an act should not "receive
such a broad construction as would destroy the plain purpose which
caused the act to be adopted."4 Title VII "should therefore be given a
liberal interpretation; . . . [and] exemptions from its sweep should be
narrowed and limited to effect the remedy intended." 9 This is necessary
so as not to contravene the purpose of Title VII: the elimination of dis-
crimination in employment. Title VII states generally that an employer
may not "discriminate against any individual with respect to his . ..
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" because of race.50 Fur-
ther, an employer or union cannot "limit, segregate, or classify. . . in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee" because of race.51 A seniority system is considered a term, condi-
tion, or privilege of employment and could easily be used to discriminate
against a worker by depriving him of employment opportunities. Section
703(h) should not "be given a scope that risks swallowing up Title VII's
otherwise broad prohibition of 'practices, procedures, or tests' that dis-
proportionately affect members of those groups that the Act protects. '52
Further, seniority systems clearly affect an employee's status. Therefore,
a broad interpretation of section 703(h), which would protect post-Act
seniority systems, would be in blatant contrast to the intent and purpose
of Title VII.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson
The Supreme Court recently addressed the problems relating to section
703(h) in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson." The American Tobacco
Company operates two plants in Richmond, Virginia.54 Each plant is di-
vided into two departments: the prefabrication department, which blends
"' Spokane & Inland Empire R.R. Co. v. United States, 241 U.S. 344, 350 (1915) (regard-
ing § 6 of the Safety Appliance Act of 1893, which exempts cars used upon street railways,
but not cars used both in regular interstate traffic and street railways).
" Piedmont & Northern Ry. Co. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1931) (discussing exemp-
tions from the Transportation Act of 1920).
50 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2). See also Cooper & Sobol, supra note 9, at 1611-12.
52 California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 608, reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 973
(1979).
53 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
One plant produces cigarettes, and the other produces pipe tobacco. Id. at 65.
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the tobacco, and the fabrication department, which finishes the final
product. Prior to 1963, the company and union practiced open discrimi-
nation. The union55 maintained segregated locals. Additionally, it segre-
gated the black workers into the lower-paying jobs at the prefabrication
units. The white workers held the higher-paying jobs available in the
fabrication department. As part of the segregation scheme, a black em-
ployee wishing to transfer from the prefabrication department to the
fabrication department had to forfeit any accumulated seniority.56
After pressure from government procurement agencies, which were re-
quired to enforce a government contractor's anti-discrimination orders,
the company instituted plant-wide seniority.5" The black union local
merged with the white local, yet discrimination still continued. Promo-
tions became based on seniority plus "certain qualifications," and black
employees continued to lose accumulated seniority if they transferred be-
tween plants. Black employees were still locked out of positions in the
fabrication departments because of their desire not to lose years of se-
niority. The Court noted that "between 1963 and 1968, . . . virtually all
vacancies in the fabrication departments were filled by white employees
due to the discretion vested in supervisors to determine who was
qualified."58
In 1968, the company abandoned its qualifications system and insti-
tuted a promotion system based on nine lines of progression." Each line
consisted of lower-paying positions coupled with progressively higher-
paying positions. In order to be eligible for an upper-level position in a
certain line of progression, it was necessary for the employee to work in
the lower-level position first. Four of these lines of progression consisted
of white top-level positions in the fabrication department which were
linked to white bottom-level positions also in the fabrication depart-
ment.60 Because black employees had historically been excluded from jobs
in the fabrication department, there remained a barrier to establishing
eligibility for top positions. In other words, blacks were closed out of
lower-level positions in the fabrication department initially because of
race, and they remained closed out. To change their situation minorities
paid a heavy price; they lost their accumulated seniority. Eventually, the
plaintiffs 1 filed charges because of the continuing effect of pre-Act and
" Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers' Int'l Union and its affiliate, Local 182,
comprise the bargaining unit for the hourly-paid workers in both the fabrication and prefab-
rication units of both plants.
6 456 U.S. at 66.
Id. This promotion policy was in force from 1963-1968.
6Id.
Id. Only six of the nine lines of progression were the subject of this lawsuit. In 1969,
the lines-of-progression system was ratified by the union.
'0 Therefore, the lines were either all white or all black.
6 Patterson and two other black employees filed charges with the EEOC. When concili-
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post-Act discrimination practices.
The Supreme Court determined that section 703(h) extends its protec-
tion to those seniority systems established after the effective date 2 of the
Act,6" thereby extending the breadth of the Act. Furiher, the Court held
that in order to obtain relief from a seniority system which discriminates,
a challenger must show that the system was instituted with an intent to
discriminate.6 4 The scope and the ramifications of American Tobacco
cannot be fully understood without a discussion of the prior decisional
law regarding section 703(h).
B. Prior Case Law
1. The Issue of Intent
Until 1964, many of the industrial plants which had a racially mixed
force maintained formally segregated job classifications based on race. 65
The better-paying, more desirable positions were reserved for whites,
while blacks were barred from competing for these positions, and were
relegated to lower-paying job slots. Although overt discrimination in em-
ployment was made illegal by Title VII, black workers found that the new
seniority systems instituted by their employers perpetuated the effects of
past discrimination. Even if no new discrimination existed after 1965,
prior job structures affected present seniority and progression rules.
Often, these plants operated under a system of departmental seniority."
After 1965, a black worker previously excluded from a "white" depart-
ment would be able to enter that department, but at the bottom of the
seniority scale. The effect was that a black worker with more company
seniority would be lower on the seniority list than a white worker who
had more departmental seniority.
The first cases to challenge the present effects of past discrimination
held that even though a seniority system was facially neutral" and was
ation efforts failed, the plaintiffs filed a class, action, alleging racial discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII and 53 U.S.C. § 1981. Subsequently, the EEOC filed both a race and sex
discrimination charge against American Tobacco Co. and the suits were consolidated for
trial. 456 U.S. at 66-67.
02 The effective date of Title VII was July 2, 1965, one year after the date of its enact-
ment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
*' 456 U.S. at 77.
Id. at 65.
Cooper & Sobol, supra note 9, at 1616.
00 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Sears
v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 645 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 964 (1982);
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
0" A facially neutral system is one that appears to measure performance traits without
any consideration of unlawful, discriminatory factors. Note, Rebutting the Griggs Prima
Facie Case Under Title VII: Limiting Judicial Review of Less Restrictive Alternatives,
1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 181, 182 n.14.
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established without discriminatory intent, it was racially discriminatory
in violation of Title VII"6 if it sustained differences in status by race, and
systematically preferred whites to blacks. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc."
proved to be a landmark decision in this area. 0 It was the first case to
challenge the legality of measuring length of service by a departmental
seniority system where blacks had historically been relegated to one de-
partment.7 1 The departmental system was facially neutral and thus hid
the discriminatory intent inherent in the seniority system. In its decision,
the court conceded that there were legitimate reasons for departmental
lines of progression, and recognized that "[iut promotes efficiency, encour-
ages junior employees to remain with the company . . . and limits the
amount of retraining that would be necessary without departmental or-
ganization. ' ' 72 However, the Quarles court held that the past organization
by segregated departments currently worked to the disadvantage of black
workers. 73
The importance of the Quarles decision lies in the fact that the court
determined that no present discriminatory intent was required; a past in-
tent to discriminate that had present effects was sufficient to constitute a
Title VII violation. After considering the legislative history of Title VII,
the court said that "Congress did not intend to freeze an entire genera-
" Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968); United States v.
Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers, 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968). Cf.
United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968). In Porter, Judge All-
good attempted to distinguish this case from Quarles and Local 189 by showing that the
seniority plan, which had a disparate impact on blacks, was sufficient because of the demon-
strated low level of ambition of black workers. 296 F. Supp. at 64-65. However, Judge All-
good predicted that the case would be of little value. 296 F. Supp. at 52.
69 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
70 Cooper & Sobol, supra note 9, at 1617.
7 Minority workers were historically relegated to the lowest-paying, least-desirable de-
partments, especially in the South. But Northern employers also used this method to ra-
cially discriminate. Black employees at Bethlehem Steel's Lackawanna, N.Y. plant were sys-
tematically pigeon-holed into the least desirable departments. See United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
71 279 F. Supp. at 513.
73
The present discrimination resulting from historically segregated departments is
apparent from consideration of the situation of a Negro who has worked for ten
years in the prefabrication department... [He must] sacrifice his employment se-
niority and take new departmental seniority based on his transfer date. Thus a
Negro with ten years employment seniority transferring . . . from the prefabrica-
tion department to the fabrication department takes an entry level position with
departmental seniority lower than a white employee with years less employment
seniority. These restrictions upon the present opportunities for Negroes result
from the racial pattern of the company's employment practice prior to Jan. 1,
1966.
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tion of Negro employees 74 into discriminatory patterns that existed before
the act."7 5
United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers,76
was in full agreement with Quarles when the court stated:
It is not the job seniority system in and of itself, but rather the
continuous discrimination practiced by the defendants within the
framework of that system, which now requires that the system be
abolished in this case .... The defendants claim that active dis-
crimination against Negroes has now ceased. But the fact that
Negroes who, under the present liberalized policy, have only re-
cently entered formerly white progression lines are forced to com-
pete with white employees for promotion on the basis of "job se-
niority" continues, in each case of such competition, the
discriminatory effect of the long history of the relegation of those
Negroes to other, less desirable lines.77
Therefore, the present effect of past discrimination 7  was deemed a pre-
74 This present-effects doctrine is relevant to women as well as blacks and other minori-
ties. See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (stripping women employees
of accumulated seniority while on pregnancy leave was a burden not placed on male workers
and constituted an unlawful employment practice); Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 633
F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981) (held that pregnant flight attend-
ants should not have to forfeit accumulated seniority). Cf. United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans,
431 U.S. 553 (1977) (seniority system which gave a present effect to past discrimination
could be treated as lawful by petitioner, United Airlines when respondent failed to file a
timely charge, and the pre-Act discrimination, alone, had no present legal consequences).
" 279 F. Supp. at 516.
76 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968). At the Crown Zellerbach Corporation's plant to
Bogalusa, there was prior intentional discrimination, which was perpetuated by a job-senior-
ity system rather than a system based on mill-wide seniority.
77 Id. at 44.
" The justification for using a present-effects-of-past-discrimination test is explained by
the following analogy:
Imagine a race with two groups of runners of equal ability. Individuals differ in
their running ability, but the average speed of the two groups is identical. Imagine
that a handicapper gives each individual in one of the groups a heavy weight to
carry. Some of those with weights would still run faster than some of those with-
out weights, but on average, the handicapped group would fall farther and farther
behind the group without the handicap.
Now suppose that someone waves a magic wand and all of the weights vanish.
Equal opportunity has been created. If the two groups are equal in their running
ability, the gap between those who never carried weights and those who used to
carry weights will cease to expand, but those who suffered the earlier discrimina-
tion will never catch up. If the economic baton can be handed on from generation
to generation, the current effects of past discrimination can linger forever.
If a fair race is one where everyone has an equal chance to win, the race is not
fair even though it is now run with fair rules . . ..
Stopping the race and starting over would involve a wholesale redistribution of
physical and human wealth. This only happens in real revolutions, if ever. This
1983-84]
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sent violation of Title VII, and 703(h) did not protect this situation from
the reach of Title VII.79
The Supreme Court first gave attention to the "present effects" con-
cept and its relationship to seniority in Franks v. Bowman Transporta-
tion Co.80 In Franks, the discriminatory practice involved discriminatory
hiring rather than a discriminatory seniority system,8' but the effects of
the hiring policy were perpetuated by the seniority system."' The discrim-
inatory practice8" prevented black applicants, through hiring, transfer,
leaves us with the choice of handicapping those who benefitted from the previous
handicaps. Discrimination against someone unfortunately always means discrimi-
nation in favor of someone else. The person gaining from discrimination may not
be the discriminator, but she or he will have to pay part of the price of eliminating
discrimination. This is true regardless of which technique is chosen to eliminate
the current effects of past discrimination ....
The need to practice discrimination (positive or negative) to eliminate the ef-
fects of past discrimination is one of the unfortunate costs of past discrimination.
To end discrimination is not to create "equal opportunity."
L. THUROW, THE ZERO SUM SOCIETY 188-89 (1980).
" The district court stated:
Where a seniority system has the effect of perpetuating discrimination and con-
centrating or "telescoping" the effect of past years of discrimination against Negro
employees into the present placement of Negroes in an inferior position for pro-
motion and other purposes, that present result is prohibited, and a seniority sys-
tem which operates to produce that present result must be replaced with another
system.
Local 189, 282 F. Supp. at 44 (emphasis in original).
80 424 U.S. 747 (1976). The main issue in this case was whether petitioners could be
awarded retroactive seniority to the date of their applications for employment. In order to
decide this issue, the Court discussed the protection afforded seniority systems, in general,
under 703(h). The Court concluded that this section does not bar remedial seniority dated
back to the date of application. Id. at 762. Cf. Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity: A Glimmer of Hope, 23 RUTGERS L. REv. 268 (1969):
The shaping of meaningful remedies for racial discrimination in seniority sys-
tems is difficult . . . . [W]hite and black employees contest for scarce job oppor-
tunities . . . . In addition, it pits the civil rights movement against the labor
movement at the institutional level and weakens the liberal-labor coalition, which
has been so influential at the political level.
Id. at 268-69.
81 424 U.S. at 757-58.
Id. at 751.
8s
[A] pattern or practice would be present only when the denial of rights consists of
something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated, routine, or of
a generalized nature. There would be a pattern or practice if, for example, a num-
ber of companies or persons in the same industry or line of business discrimi-
nated, if a chain of motels or restaurants practiced racial discrimination through-
out all or a significant part of its system, or if a company repeatedly and regularly
engaged in acts prohibited by the statute.
The point is that single, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by a single
business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice . . ..
110 CONG. REC. 14,270 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
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and discharge, from entering over-the-road8 ' truck-driving positions.8 5 Af-
ter discussing the legislative history of section 703(h), the Court said:
[I]t is apparent that the thrust of the section is directed toward
defining what is and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice
in instances in which the post-Act operation of a seniority system
is challenged as perpetuating the effects of discrimination occur-
ring prior to the effective date of the Act.8
The Court continued by explaining that section 703(h) was not meant to
"modify or restrict relief otherwise appropriate once an illegal discrimina-
tory practice occurring after the effective date of the Act is proved. '8 7
This accords with Quarles to the extent that the present effects of past
discrimination warrant remedial action.
An analogous line of reasoning was used regarding employment testing
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co."8 While testing has been treated differently
in the case law, 9 the issue of intent in Griggs is still relevant for analysis
at this point. Griggs was brought by the black employees at Duke Power
Company's Dan River Steam Station." The employees felt the testing
procedure used by the company discriminated against them.
Before the effective date of Title VII, there had been open discrimina-
tion. The company operated five departments 91 but employed blacks only
in the labor department "where the highest paying jobs paid less than the
lowest paying jobs in the other four . . . departments in which only
whites were employed." ' 2 Prior to 1965, the company required that em-
ployees have a high- school education for all but the labor department.
84 Over-the-road drivers, also known as "line drivers," engage in long-distance hauling.
431 U.S. at 329 n.3.
8 424 U.S. at 751. This seems to have been a common practice that was perpetuated by
employers and unions in the trucking business. In International B'hd. of Teamsters v.
United States, "the company ... did not employ a Negro on a regular basis as a line
driver until 1969." 431 U.S. at 337 (emphasis in original).
" 424 U.S. at 761.
87 Id. at 761-62.
- 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
89 See generally Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (giving deference to
EEOC validation studies for showing correlation to the relevant jobs); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (The disproportionate impact of a testing procedure was analyzed under
the Equal Protection clause); Guardians Ass'n. of New York City v. Civil Serv. Comm'n.,
630 F.2d 79 (2d Cer. 1979) (where testing is unrelated to job performance, Title VII has
been violated).
"0 401 U.S. at 426. The petitioners were 13 of the 14 black employees at the Dan River
Station in Draper, North Carolina. The total number of employees at this plant was 95. Id.
"' Id. at 427. The five departments were: Labor, Coal Handling, Operations, Mainte-
nance, and Laboratory and Test.
" Id. (footnote omitted). The first assignment of a black worker to a department outside
of Labor occurred in August, 1966. This was five months after charges had been filed with
the EEOC. Id. at 427 n.2.
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On July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII, the company instituted a
new policy, which provided that employees must achieve a satisfactory
score on two professionally prepared aptitude tests in order to qualify for
the "white" departments. s This system effectively barred black employ-
ees from certain departments and favored white employees.
The Supreme Court concluded that "practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discrimina-
tory employment practices. '94 This language clearly does not limit the
scope of the decision to employment tests. The Court explained that Con-
gress required the removal of barriers to employment when they invidi-
ously discriminate."5 Griggs illustrates the Supreme Court's lack of em-
phasis on "intent" to discriminate and focuses on the "effects" of
discrimination. The Court explicitly stated that "[t]he Act proscribes not
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in operation."' The Supreme Court interpreted "the thrust
of the Act [as going] to the consequences of employment practices, not
simply the motivation.' '97 Both seniority systems and testing schemes are
a practice of employment. Thus Griggs has precedential value for cases
concerning the discriminatory effects of seniority systems."
The above case law points out that no present intent to discriminate
was needed.9 The present effect of a prior intent was sufficient to bring
section 703(h) into play. The above cases did not even attempt to find a
present intent based upon the continuation of discriminatory practices.
The fact that one group was perpetually held in an inferior position was
sufficient for the courts to find a violation of Title VII.P1 0
93 Id. at 427-28. Neither test was geared toward measuring aptitude for a particular job.
Id. at 428. The tests also bore no relationship to successful work performance. Id. at 431.
", Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
91 Id. at 431.
9' Id. The Court explained further that business necessity might make such a testing
system lawful under Title VII, but that none was shown. Seniority systems are necessary for
business but they can be amended through collective bargaining to abolish any discrimina-
tory effects. In situations where seniority systems are facially neutral but where past dis-
crimination "freezes" blacks'into an inferior position, the situation can be equalized by re-
medial action to put the black workers in the position they would have been in had there
been no discrimination. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
401 U.S. at 432 (emphasis in original).
" This is especially relevant because employment testing and seniority systems are en-
compassed within the same .subsection of Title VII.
99 "Acts taken before the effective date of Title VII (July 2, 1965) are relevant for the
purpose of showing an intent manifested since that date to discriminate against blacks."
Johnson v. Olin Corp., 484 F. Supp. 577, 579-80 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
'00 Six courts of appeals agreed that § 703(h) did not immunize seniority systems that
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination. These courts have indicated this position in
more than 30 cases without one dissent. See 431 U.S. at 378 n.2 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 32:607
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol32/iss4/5
SENIORITY SYSTEM EXEMPTION
The Supreme Court, in 1976, began to modify the stance set out in
cases that had held that section 703(h) did not immunize the present ef-
fect of past discrimination perpetuated by a seniority system.' In Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, the Court held that
"an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become un-
lawful under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrim-
ination,"10 2 although the Court conceded that there is much support for
the Quarles and Griggs rationale.10 3
Teamsters presented a fact situation analogous to that in Franks. Both
cases concerned seniority systems in the trucking industry. The seniority
system in Teamsters measured seniority by bargaining unit for competi-
tive purposes. 04 Seniority was used in bidding for particular runs, in pro-
tection from layoff, 0 5 and in determining the order in which employees
were recalled from layoff. Further, if an employee wished to transfer to a
line-driving job from a city driver or service position, the employee had to
forfeit all accumulated seniority. 0 s Because of prior discrimination',
whereby blacks'0 8 were not hired into line-driver positions, the seniority
system's present effect was to perpetuate segregation in the departments.
The disincentive to transfer to another position applied equally to all
workers, but because they were previously "locked out" of line-driving
jobs, blacks suffered and most, as they had been denied the opportunity
to enter this department when initially hired.
The district court and the court of appeals, relying on prior case law,
held that this built-in disadvantage was a continuing violation of Title
VII.1°0 The Supreme Court, however, said it would be a violation of Title
'0' See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
102 431 U.S. at 354.
'o' Id. at 346 n.28.
'o' Id. at 343.
106 Continental Can of Harvey, Louisiana had an all-white work force (except for two
black workers hired during World War II) until 1965. By 1971, blacks numbered 50 out of
the 400 employees. In the next two years, there were massive layoffs according to seniority.
The work force decreased to 152 employees, all being white except for the two blacks hired
during the war. Watkins v. United Steel Workers, Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975). This exemplifies the effect of
seniority on layoffs.
'0' 431 U.S. at 344.
"I7 As of March 31, 1977 (soon after this suit was commenced) the company had 6,472
employees. Of these, 314 (5%) were black, and 257 (4%) were Spanish-surnamed Ameri-
cans. There were 1,828 positions as linedrivers and of these, eight (0.4%) were filled by
black employees and five (0.3%) were filled by Spanish-surnamed employees. All of the
black employees on the line-driver jobs were hired after this litigation began. Id. at 337.
108 For the sake of brevity, reference is made only to blacks, although the discrimination
was directed against Spanish-surnamed individuals as well.
431 U.S. at 331-33.
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VII were it not for section 703(h).'1 0 The Court stated that the Griggs
rationale would not apply. Griggs held that "practices which are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation""' are those which perpetuate the
effects of prior discrimination, and cannot be maintained if they 'freeze'
the status quo." ' 2 The Teamsters Court stated that this would be a
Griggs situation but for the presence of the seniority system."'3
The Court relied on Teamsters when it decided American Tobacco, but
took the rationale one step further, by determining that the impact of
past discrimination is not enough. Actual intent to discriminate must be
proved."" The American Tobacco Court decided that the legislative his-
tory was unclear, and instead considered the "plain language" of the
statute." '
Emphasis was placed on the language that the exemption will apply
"provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to dis-
criminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."" 6
American Tobacco interpreted this language as requiring a present intent
to discriminate. The Court clearly could have interpreted the language as
requiring intent in the initial development of the seniority system. ' 7 In
all of these cases, it is undisputed that initially there was an intent to
discriminate and that this intent was maintained in the seniority sys-
tem."18 Therefore, courts should impute the initial intent into subsequent
conduct which perpetuates the discriminatory intent, and thus hold the
conduct unlawful.
110 Id. at 349.
"' 401 U.S. at 431.
.1. Id. at 430.
", 431 U.S. at 349. The Court recognized that
[tihis disproportionate distribution of advantages does in a very real sense "oper-
ate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." But
both the literal terms of § 703(h) and the legislative history of Title VII demon-
strate that Congress considered this very effect of many seniority systems and
extended a measure of immunity to them.
Id. at 350 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430).
.. 456 U.S. at 65. "Under 703(h), the fact that a seniority system has a discriminatory
impact is not alone sufficient to invalidate the system; actual intent to discriminate must be
proved." Id. (emphasis added).
115 Id. at 68.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) (emphasis added).
117 See 431 U.S. at 382 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Justice
Marshall's opinion points out that under this interpretation the seniority system would not
fall under the exemption provided by § 703(h)).
'18 Title VII has a short statute of limitations, one reason plaintiffs could not rely on
initial intent in formulating a challenge to seniority systems. The statute of limitations re-
quires that a complaint "be filed [with the EEOC] within 180 days after the alleged unlaw-
ful employment practice occurred," or within 210 days if filed with the state. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e) (1976). [To interpret Title VII as requiring this intent, Title Vii's prohibition
on actions adversely affecting particular employees would be undercut.] See Note, Title VII,
Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1260, 1267-68 (1967).
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The requirement of present intent to discriminate is an extremely
heavy burden for plaintiffs to carry in order to challenge a seniority sys-
tem. As succinctly stated by one court: "Seldom does a party intent on
practicing discrimination declare or announce his purpose. It is more
likely that methods subtle and elusive are used to accomplish the desired
discrimination."11 9 Not only would potential plaintiffs need to prove that
employers intended to discriminate against them, but also that differ-
ences in compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
were the result of this intention.
Placing such a burden on plaintiffs who challenge seniority sys-
tems with admitted discriminatory impact, a burden never before
imposed in civil suits brought under Title VII, frustrates the
clearly expressed will of Congress and effectively 'freeze[s] an en-
tire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns
that existed before the Act.' "120
To require a showing of intent places a barrier in the way of achieving
equal employment opportunity. Title VII's purpose was the elimination
of "those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered ra-
cially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citi-
zens." 12' Attempts to effectuate this purpose can only be frustrated by
having to prove intent rather than discriminatory impact. The American
Tobacco decision heavily burdens a plaintiff bringing an action under sec-
tion 703(h). The sections of Title VII which define discrimination do not
even refer to intent. 1 2 Instead, Title VII makes unlawful practices which
"tend to deprive" or "adversely affect" the employee because of unlawful
classifications.1 23 Absent is language referring to an employer's reasons for
119 Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications, 7 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REV. 473,
480 (1966) (quoting Marrano Constr. Co. v. New York State Comm'n for Human Rights, 45
Misc. 2d 1081, 1085, 259 N.Y.S.2d 4, 9 (1965)).
t20 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Quarles, 279 F. Supp. at 505).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
122 Section 703(a)(2) and (c)(2) of Title VII define discrimination as follows:
to limit, segregate or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or
to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties, or would limit such employment opportunities, or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2) (1976) (emphasis added). However, some have interpreted the lan-
guage, "because of ... race" as requiring intent. See Comment, Layoffs and Title VII:
The Conflict Between Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunities, 1975 Wis. L. REV.
791, 796.
123 Stated in another way, "Title VII is result-oriented, and it looks to the effect of prac-
tices and not the presence of discriminatory motive behind them in determining compliance
with its mandates." OvVIEw OF LEGAL IssuEs, supra note 11, at 11.
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his discriminatory practice. This language "strongly suggest[s] the cover-
age of all practices having a discriminatory effect."' 2 Therefore, the re-
quirement of intent in American Tobacco is inapposite to the purpose of
Title VII and places a heavy burden on challengers of a seniority sys-
tem. 1 25 After American Tobacco, any challenge to a seniority system
under Title VII will require litigating the issue of whether there was dis-
criminatory intent,12  adversely affecting already-overloaded court
dockets.
2. The Extension of Section 703(h)'s Reach to Post-Act Adoption of a
Bona Fide Seniority System
The American Tobacco Court effectively broadened the reach of the
seniority exemption by holding that section 703(h) exempts post-Act, as
well as pre-Act, adoption of seniority systems.2 7 The Court rejected the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's interpretation that section
703(h) protects the post-Act application of seniority systems but not the
post-Act adoption of seniority systems. 28 Instead, the Court emphasized
the "plain language" of the statute, which makes no explicit distinctions
between pre-Act or post-Act seniority systems.' 29 By holding that the se-
niority exemption applied to both pre- and post-Act systems, the Court
did not preclude its application to the American Tobacco lines-of-pro-
gression system-a post-Act seniority system.
The Court expressed a reluctance to transform what it considered a
"definitional clause"'2 0 into a "grandfather clause."'' But as the dissent
12' Cooper & Sobol, supra note 9, at 1674.
121 The plaintiff has the burden of proving a prima facie case of racial discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence. 411 U.S. at 802. The McDonnell Douglas Court said this
may be proved by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for ajob for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifica-
tions, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complain-
ant's qualifications.
Id. The Court explained that the facts, and thus the criteria, necessary to sustain a prima
facie case will differ from ease to case. What is significant is that there is no reference,
implied or explicit, to intent. Once the initial burden is met, the burden then shifts to the
defendant (employer) "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its con-
duct. Id.
' See Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 273, 287-88 (1982) (intent is a pure question of
fact).
", 456 U.S. at 77.
128 Id. at 68.
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
"s In Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., the Court discussed the definitional aspect of
§ 703(h):
[I]t is apparent that the thrust of the section is directed toward defining what is
and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice in instances in which the post-
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pointed out, the plain language of the clause reads that "it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different stan-
dards."1 2 This can be interpreted as meaning that the application of an
already-existing seniority system would be protected, as opposed to the
protection of a wholly new system adopted after the effective date of the
Act."
s
The dissent's interpretation is in accordance with the legislative his-
tory, which emphasizes protecting "established" seniority rights. "Title
VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes
effect. 13 4 The interpretive memorandum submitted by Senators Clark
and Case explains that "Title VII would have no effect on established
seniority rights. The effect is prospective and not retrospective. '"1 35 The
American Tobacco majority conceded that "statements made prior to the
introduction of section 703(h) by proponents of Title VII are evidence of
the meaning of section 703(h)." s6 Therefore, because emphasis was
placed on protecting established rights, and no emphasis was placed on
future seniority systems, the obvious conclusion would be that section
703(h) limits its protection to seniority systems already in existence. But
the majority did not reach the conclusion that section 703(h) was limited
to pre-Act systems. Rather, the American Tobacco Court extended the
reach of section 703(h) to post-Act systems, contrary to the purposes of
Title VII. Section 703(h) was merely added to give narrow protection to
existing seniority systems. There is no mention of the adoption of post-
Act systems in the history of section 703(h) because this would have come
under the affirmative provisions of Title VII, especially in light of the
fact that the provisions guide unions " 7 as well as employers.138 The sec-
tion refers solely to the employer's practices. Employers are usually re-
sponsible for the application of a seniority system. The employer and
union are ordinarily responsible for the adoption of a seniority system,
Act operation of a seniority system is challenged as perpetuating the effects of
discrimination occurring prior to the effective date of the Act.
424 U.S. at 761.
"1 456 U.S. at 69. A "grandfather clause" is a "[plrovision in a new law or regulation
exempting those already in or part of the existing system which is being regulated." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, 629 (rev. 5th ed. 1971). Such clauses are "calculated to prevent hardship
by saving accrued rights and interests from the operation of a new rule." 2A C. SANDS STAT-
UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.12 (4th ed. Supp. 1983).
... Id. at 80 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2003-2(h)) (emphasis added).
"I Accord Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968).
134 110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964).
13 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964). The majority opinion omits the second sentence of this
quotation, thereby misinterpreting the legislative history. See 456 U.S. at 73.
"" 456 U.S. at 73 n..
M8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2) (1976).
"' Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(2).
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and may both be held liable for discrimination under Title VII."s , To-
gether, the union and employer negotiate the adoption of a seniority sys-
tem as part of the collective bargaining agreement. The seniority system
is a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment in which there can be
no tendency to deprive an employee of his status as an employee, because
of unlawful criteria. 140 Therefore, section 703(h) protects only seniority
systems already in effect.
IV. WHAT IS A BONA FIDE SENIORITY SYSTEM?
It is clear that the American Tobacco decision places a heavy burden
upon employees who wish to challenge a seniority system that is allegedly
discriminatory. These employees have the onerous task of proving that a
seniority system is either discriminatory on its face, was instituted and
maintained for intentionally discriminatory purposes, or is not "bona
fide" within the meaning of section 703(h).
Facially discriminatory seniority systems are rare, as employers have
increased their awareness of the potential legal problems that arise from
blatantly discriminatory seniority systems. Further, to prove that a se-
niority system is intentionally discriminatory is almost impossible:""
"Today, although flagrant examples of intentional discrimination still ex-
ist, discrimination more often occurs 'on a more sophisticated and subtle
level,' the effects of which are often as cruel and 'devastating as the most
crude form of discrimination.' ,"42 Therefore, only the last option of prov-
ing that a seniority system is not "bona fide," has potential as a strategy
for Title VII litigants.
The American Tobacco Court refused to address the issue of what con-
stitutes a bona fide seniority system.143 In light of the Court's emphasis
on the "plain language" of the statute, it is anomalous that the Court
would not consider the issue." The statute explicitly states that a senior-
... 456 U.S. at 80. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140 Id.
141 Cf. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 413 (1982) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). This case involved a discrimination suit brought under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but is relevant in discussing the requirement of proving "in-
tent" under Title VII. As noted by Justice Marshall: "The profound national policy of blot-
ting out all vestiges of racial discrimination, [is] no less frustrated when equal opportunities
are denied through cleverly masked or merely insensitive practices, where proof of actual
intent is nearly impossible to obtain . . . ." Id.
... Id. at 412 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Local 542 Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 469
F. Supp. 329, 337 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 648 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1981)).
1 456 U.S. at 68 n.2.
.. The majority demonstrated its focus on statutory language by stating: As in all cases
involving statutory construction, our starting point must be the language employed by Con-
gress, . . . and we must assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of the words used." Id. at 68 (citations omitted).
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ity system must be "bona fide" to come under the seniority exemption. " 5
The literal meaning of "bona fide" is "good faith, ' '"4 but this definition
does not help with the practical application of the statute to specific fact
situations. The courts have grappled with defining "bona fide," but no
operational definition has emerged which could serve as a guideline for
potential litigants. Furthermore, neither Title VII nor its legislative his-
tory offers any help in this area.
In Quarles, the district court reasoned that "bona fide" must mean a
lack of discrimination.1 47 The court held that a "departmental seniority
system that has its genesis in racial discrimination is not a bona fide se-
niority systems." 4 " Because the Philip Morris Company had established
its seniority lists based on a policy of segregation, and continued to use
those lists after the effective date of Title VII, its system was outside the
protection afforded bona fide seniority plans.
1 4 9
The Quarles court based its decision on the language of section 703(h):
. . provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to
discriminate."' 50 The "intent" indicated in the statute was interpreted as
referring to the initial discriminatory hiring decisions which were main-
tained by the current seniority system.' 5' In other words, Quarles stands
for the proposition that a seniority system which perpetuates the effects
of past discrimination cannot be bona fide. 
5 2
The Teamsters decision modified the Quarles definition of a bona fide
seniority system. In Teamsters, the Court rejected the argument that "no
seniority system that tends to perpetuate pre-Act discrimination can be
'bona fide.' "'se However, the Teamsters Court incorporated the Quarles
"genesis" test into its analysis and found the seniority system valid. The
factors that Teamsters relied upon to make its decision were best set out
145 "[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards . . . of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h) (1976) (emphasis added).
'" Generally, "bona fide" means "with good faith; without fraud or deception; genuine."
WEBSTER's N w TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 206 (2d ed. 1978). Likewise, a legal defini-
tion provides: "In or with good faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely; without deceit or
fraud .. " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 160 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
"' 279 F. Supp. at 517. What actually constitutes discrimination also has not been suffi-
ciently defined. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
48 Id. One commentator has asked whether any "seniority system set up prior to the
Civil Rights Act which deliberately excluded Negroes [can] ever be bona fide." Rachlin,
supra note 119, at 480.
" 279 F. Supp. at 517.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
i 279 F. Supp. at 517. See Comment, supra note 122, at 802 n.56.
:5 279 F. Supp. at 517-18.
63 431 U.S. at 353. "To accept the argument would require us to hold that a seniority
system becomes illegal simply because it allows the full exercise of the pre-Act seniority
rights of employees of a company that discriminated before Title VII was enacted." Id.
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in James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co. 5 " as:
1) whether the seniority system operates to discourage all em-
ployees equally from transferring between seniority units;
2) whether the seniority units are in the same or separate bar-
gaining units (if the later, whether that structure is rational and
in conformance with industry practice); 3) whether the seniority
system had its genesis in racial discrimination; and 4) whether
the system was negotiated and has been maintained free from any
illegal purpose. 155
The Teamsters Court applied these four elements to the facts and
found the system to be a bona fide seniority system. The first factor was
satisfied because the seniority system treated all employees equally.'
The seniority system in question had the effect of locking workers out of
better jobs by forcing them to lose accumulated seniority. However, the
Court held that this disincentive to transfer worked against white workers
as well as black workers. 57 There is an assumption inherent in this rea-
soning that a neutral hiring practice will, in time, result in a representa-
tional racial population.'5" To view the seniority system under this as-
sumption is to ignore the pattern of segregation that existed prior to the
current system. Under this pattern, blacks were systematically kept out.
One commentator explains:
In most cases. . . seniority systems discriminate because of racist
hiring and assignment practices. Where those racist practices are
absent, almost any system can pass muster under Title VII. Thus,
the hunt for "neutral principles of seniority" generated by this
concept of "bona fide seniority systems" must be put aside in
favor of a sharp look at the facts of the case before the court. 5 9
559 F.2d 311, 352 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
'6 Id. The James court extrapolated these four factors from the following passage in
Teamsters:
The seniority system in this litigation is entirely bona fide. It applies equally to
all races and ethnic groups. To the extent that it "locks" employees into non-line-
driver jobs, it does so for all .... The placing of line drivers in a separate bar-
gaining unit from other employees is rational, in accord with the industry practice,
and consistent with National Labor Relation Board precedents. It is conceded
that the seniority system did not have its genesis in racial discrimination, and that
it was negotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal purpose.
431 U.S. at 355-56 (footnotes omitted).
' 431 U.S. at 355-56. In other words, the seniority system was facially neutral.
... Id. at 356.
s Id. at 339 n.20. Accord EEOC v. Navajo Ref. Co., 593 F.2d 988, 991-92 (10th Cir. 1979)
(the company required a high school education and a passing grade on a test as a prerequi-
site to employment, but petitioners failed to show the testing resulted in discrimination in
fact).
"" Blumrosen, supra note 80, at 290.
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The argument would follow that although a seniority system might be
facially neutral, if it perpetuated past discrimination due to a disincentive
to transfer for fear of losing accumulated seniority, such system would
not be bona fide.6 0 While blacks newly hired for line-driver jobs would be
able to compete equally with newly-hired whites, "Title VII was not
meant to freeze an entire generation of black employees into discrimina-
tory positions."' 61
The Teamsters Court decided that the second factor of its test was met
in that maintaining separate bargaining units for line-drivers was rational
and in conformity with industry practice. The third factor, that the se-
niority system did not have its genesis in racial discrimination, and the
fourth factor, that the seniority structure was negotiated and had been
maintained free from any illegal purpose, were conceded by the parties.'
In James, the parties were not as willing to concede these factors as the
parties were in Teamsters. The claim was that "Stockham's departmental
seniority system, which [was] neutral on its face, [was] unlawful because
it accentuate[d] the effects of Stockham's discriminatory job assignment
practices."'6" As in the system in American Tobacco, employees who
wished to transfer to a new department lost all seniority accumulated at
the time of the transfer. In other words, "black employees must choose to
commit 'seniority suicide'"'16" to change departments.
The James court applied the Teamsters elements to the facts at
hand."' The James court noted that the crux of whether there has been
purposeful discrimination depends on whether the seniority system is or
is not bona fide."' The court further stated that there should be a case-
by-case analysis of whether a seniority system is bona fide under section
703(h)."'7 However, the court remanded the case to the district court for a
determination of whether the system was bona fide, since evidence had
not previously been presented on the issue. " Unlike the American To-
1"0 The Teamsters Court did not follow this argument. Instead, the Court stated that "an
otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII
simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination." 431 U.S. at 353-54.
There is some question about the use of the word "legitimate" in the statement above.
See American Tobacco Co., 453 U.S. at 87 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If a seniority sys-
tem is not 'legitimate,' it is not 'bona fide' within the meaning of the Act.").
161 Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968).
102 431 U.S. at 356.
163 James v. Stockham Valves & Fitting Co., 559 F.2d 310, 347 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1977).
'6 Id. at 348.
1on See supra note 155.
100 559 F.2d at 351. "A system designed or operated to discriminate on an illegal basis is
not a 'bona fide' system." Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 1978).
1*7 559 F.2d at 352 ("The Facts of a particular seniority unit are critical to a determina-
tion whether the system is bona fide.").
100 Id. at 353. There are many examples of cases appealed to the federal circuit courts and
then remanded in light of Teamsters and James. See, e.g., California Brewers Assn. v. Bry-
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bacco Court, the James court left the guidelines gleaned from Teamsters
for future courts' consideration.
Wattleton v. International Brotherhood of Boiler Makers169 was de-
cided in light of James and Teamsters. There the district court found the
seniority system was not bona fide and thus not entitled to section 703(h)
treatment, holding "that the seniority systems negotiated between [the
company] and the [union] have and were intended to have a disparate
impact on black workers. 1 7 0 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit upheld the district court's findings and stated that "it is clearly a
violation. . . for a union ... to maintain a seniority system for the pur-
pose of excluding Negroes from membership because of their race; and
certainly, such a system is not protected by the exception in section
703[(h)] of Title VII.''
The reasoning in Wattleton is not significantly different from that used
in finding the intent required by American Tobacco. Although Wattleton
emphasizes the fact that the seniority system was maintained in order to
have a disparate impact on blacks, it also gives weight to the fact that the
system was initially negotiated with the purpose of discriminating. The
question remains whether there can ever be a separate cause of action to
prove a seniority system is not bona fide without having to prove inten-
tional discrimination. It seems that "the issue of whether there has been
purposeful discrimination in connection with the establishment or contin-
uation of a seniority system is integral to a determination that the system
is or is not bona fide.'17 2
In United States v. Georgia Power Co., 75 the court seemed to use an
intent and an effect analysis to determine whether the system was bona
fide. The court applied the James four-part test and found that the se-
niority system failed all four segments.1 7 4 Under the first factor, whether
the system discouraged all employees equally from transferring, the sys-
tem was found to be facially neutral. However, the court held that this
neutrality "was but a mask for the gross inequality beneath.' ' 7 5 This con-
ant, 444 U.S. 598, 610-11 (1979); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 700 F.2d 1339, 1344 (11th
Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Ball Corp., 661 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 1981); Pettway v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1192 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); Acha
v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 1978)
"I Wattleton v. International Bhd. of Boiler Makers, 686 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 1199 (1983).
170 520 F. Supp. at 1347. The district court found that the seniority system, which was
collectively bargained for, was "negotiated and maintained with a purpose of preventing
only blacks from entering into jobs under the jurisdiction of the [union]." Id. at 1346.
17' 686 F.2d at 593.
7' United States v. Georgia Power Co., 634 F.2d 929, 934 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting James
v. Stockham Valves & Fitting Co., 559 F.2d 310, 351 (5th Cir. 1977)).
173 634 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1981).
"'1 Id. at 935-36.
175 Id. at 935.
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clusion was reached because only five blacks had ever been hired in any
position higher than the lowest job classifications. 7 6 This system effec-
tively "locked" black workers into the lower-paying jobs.
The second factor, referring to separate bargaining units, was not ap-
plied to the facts at hand because the separate units had been consoli-
dated.1 77 Therefore the court did not consider this factor and proceeded
to the third element to determine whether the seniority system had its
roots in racial discrimination. In this case the facts provided a genesis in
"an era of overt racial discrimination . . . when by formal policy blacks
were prevented from holding any jobs other than those in the four lowest,
most menial classifications. 178 These classifications were not connected
to any line of progression as the upper-level classifications were. The for-
mal policy found in this case would surely be evidence of intentional dis-
crimination. It is at this level of the James inquiry that the concept of
intentional discrimination enters the analysis of whether a system is bona
fide.
The "genesis" portion of the test should be limited to determining
whether there was general discrimination practiced at the time the se-
niority system was first instituted. To require proof of actual, intentional
discrimination would raise a plaintiff's burden to a level of nearly that
necessary to prove present intentional discrimination. Facts supporting a
claim of intentional discrimination present at the genesis of the seniority
system, should make it possible to prove intentional discrimination; it
should be unnecessary to resort to a cause of action which attempts to
prove the system was not bona fide.
The Supreme Court followed previous decisions and upheld a require-
ment of intent to discriminate in Pullman-Standard v. Swint,'1 79 a case
originally brought to challenge the departmental seniority system main-
tained at the Pullman-Standard Company. The plaintiff claimed that the
system perpetuated the effects of past discrimination.180
At trial, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama held that the seniority system was valid, and thus bona fide
under 703(h).' 8' In reversing, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.'8 " The Supreme Court then overturned the appellate
court decision because that court had made an independent determina-
"7 Id. Cf. Teamsters, where those discouraged from transferring to better positions were
not predominantly members of minority groups. 431 U.S. at 353-56.
.7. 634 F.2d at 936.
178 Id.
179 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
'8O Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1980).
1' Id. at 528.
'" "There is no doubt, based upon the record in this case, about the existence of a dis-
criminatory purpose." Id. at 533.
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tion beyond the scope of the "clearly erroneous" rule."8 3
All three courts applied the James test in their consideration of the
seniority system yet came to differing results. The district court found
the seniority system to be bona fide. The appellate court came to an op-
posite conclusion. "There is no doubt, based upon the record in this case,
about the existence of a discriminatory purpose. The obvious principal
aim of the [union] in 1941 was to exclude black workers from its bargain-
ing unit."'" The completely opposite conclusions rendered from identical
criteria as applied to identical facts point out the need for an operational
definition of "bona fide."
The Supreme Court in Pullman-Standard, as in American Tobacco,
had the ideal opportunity to define fully "bona fide." Instead of seizing
the chance offered by favorable fact patterns, the Court merely reiterated
its requirement of a showing of intent. "Thus any challenge to a seniority
system under Title VII will require a trial on the issue of discriminatory
intent: Was the system adopted because of its racially discriminatory
impact?"'8 5
Until a working definition of "bona fide" is developed by the Court,
plaintiffs will be faced with yet another barrier in their attempts to chal-
lenge the legality of seniority systems. Plaintiffs need a definition of
"bona fide" in order to know whether they may have an alternate litiga-
tion strategy, or whether they must prove intentional discrimination in all
circumstances. 1' s Without a working definition of "bona fide," the lan-
guage of section 703(h) is emasculated and void of purpose.
183 456 U.S. at 290-93. The discussion of Rule 52(a) was the main thrust of the Court's
discussion; however, its treatment of the facts is relevant to a discussion of bona fide senior-
ity systems.
18 624 F.2d at 533. Continuing, the court stated that "the system [was) not legally valid
under § 703(h) of Title VII." Id. at 534.
1" 456 U.S. at 277. The Court conceded that evidence of discriminatory impact may enter
the analysis:
This is not to say that discriminatory impact is not part of the evidence to be
considered by the trial court in reaching a finding on whether there was such a
discriminatory intent as a factual matter .... Discriminatory intent here means
actual motive; it is not a legal presumption to be drawn from a factual showing of
something less than actual motive.
Id. at 289-90 (footnote omitted). Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented on
grounds similar to those of their dissents in American Tobacco. See 456 U.S. at 77-90.
l88 For cases which invalidated the seniority system without actually proving an intent to
discriminate, see Scarlett v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 676 F.2d 1043, 1052 (5th Cir. 1982).
According to the Fifth Circuit: "In this case the differing treatment of black trainmen was
not the product of applying the facially neutral provision regarding promotion. Rather, the
discrimination was the result of the defendants' consistent disregard of the applicability of
that provision to black trainmen. Hence . . . § 703(h) offers no immunity .... " Id. See
also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 253 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding
that the seniority provisions did not measure what they purported to measure. Therefore
the problem is "not that [the seniority system] perpetuates the effects of past discrimina-
tion, but rather that it perpetuated discrimination.").
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V. THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF American Tobacco v. Patterson AND
RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGE
A. American Tobacco Analysis Applied to Quarles
One method of understanding the impact of American Tobacco is to
apply its rationale to an earlier case. It becomes clear that analyzing the
facts of Quarles in light of American Tobacco would result in a different
holding. An American Tobacco analysis requires 1) that there be a pre-
sent intent to discriminate, and 2) that section 703(h) extend its protec-
tion to post-Act, as well as pre-Act seniority systems. 187
In Quarles, the court held that the employees 88 were discriminated
against with respect to advancement, transfer, and seniority.8 9 Seniority
provisions were covered in a collective bargaining agreement, which took
effect February 1, 1965, before the effective date of Title VII. °90 The
company used both company and departmental seniority, but for pur-
poses of promotion, transfer, and preferential shifts, departmental senior-
ity was used as the measure. 9 ' The use of this measure had a disparate
impact on blacks, who had historically been prevented from entering the
fabrication department. In order to transfer, employees were forced to
forego accumulated departmental seniority. The Quarles court granted
relief to the plaintiffs, but under an American Tobacco analysis, no relief
would be forthcoming.
The seniority system was facially neutral. It was the past intent to keep
blacks out that presently caused the disparate impact. Consequently,
there was no present intent to discriminate, because the seniority system
affected blacks and whites equally. Under American Tobacco, a present
intent cannot be inferred from a past intent."2 Further, the seniority lists
in Quarles went into practice prior to the effective date of Title VII, so
section 703(h) would protect this system.'93 In contrast, the Quarles court
held the present effects of past discrimination were sufficient to show an
unlawful employment practice. 94 Therefore, under an American Tobacco
analysis, Quarles would have been decided against the plaintiffs.
This case illustrates the broad reach of the American Tobacco decision.
18 See 456 U.S. 65, 76-77. Previous cases could also be discussed in light of whether their
systems are bona fide, but because the American Tobacco Court chose to ignore this analy-
sis, such an analysis will not be undertaken here.
188 The plaintiffs were a class of black employees who were hired in the prefabrication
department prior to January 1, 1966. 279 F. Supp. at 507.
189 Id.
'9o Id. at 511. This agreement was modified by a "Memorandum of Understanding" on
March 7, 1966. Id.
191 Id. at 513.
182 456 U.S. at 70.
... 279 F. Supp. at 517-18. The Quarles Court further held that § 703(h) would not apply
because the seniority system was not "bona fide". Id.
194 Id. at 518.
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The Court, in effect, has given a ticket to employers and unions to utilize
their seniority systems to enact racial preferences. The message to em-
ployers is merely that they must be sure to cloak any intent to discrimi-
nate in a facially neutral system. Further, companies can continually
adopt new seniority plans knowing that they will be protected by the
broad reach of section 703(h). Indeed, there is a need for change in the
law regarding Title VII and section 703(h).
B. Collective Bargaining
Seniority systems are of "overriding importance" in collective bargain-
ing agreements, 19 5 and the union's role in this type of agreement is af-
fected by both Title VII and section 703(h). The union's role in negotiat-
ing collective bargaining contracts is crucial; this "provides the
opportunity for discriminating in favor of some individuals and groups
and against others."' 19 Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment.
If an unlawful seniority system is incorporated into the collective bargain-
ing agreement, the union will have entered into an illegal, unenforceable
contract."0 7 The difficulty in interpreting section 703(h) and the problems
with judicial interpretation of section 703(h) offer little guidance for the
unions in their role as bargaining agent.
Seniority systems can be changed by agreement between the union and
the employer. 198 A seniority system gives a status to individuals that is
created by contract and may be terminated or modified by contract. 99
But the contract is not one that all the employees enter into voluntarily.
"[R]ather, it is a collective agreement, a contract between an employer
and a union which owes an obligation of fair representation to its mem-
bers, but which need not obtain the individual consent of any one of them
to the terms of the bargain."' 00 The basic limitation on the union is a
'0 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 346 (1964). See also Trans World Airlines v. Hardi-
son, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977) (seniority provisions "are universally included in these con-
tracts"); Aaron, supra note 7, at 1534 ("[Tjhe seniority principle is so important that it is
embodied in virtually every collective agreement. It is thus the product of collective bargain-
ing; it owes its very existence to the collective agreement.").
'" Aaron, supra note 7, at 1535. "Subject only to the requirement of good faith, it may
propose or agree to changes in existing seniority rights that are adverse and detrimental to
the interests of some of the employees affected." Id. at 1536.
19 Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226, 235 (4th Cir. 1975) (if bargaining
agreements are in violation of the law, they are not binding).
'" Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (where the Court decided that the
union had the authority to give seniority credit to employees for pre-employment military
service); accord Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at 779 (1976).
" Aaron, supra note 7, at 1533.
"4Id. The collective bargaining agreement subordinates the interests of the individual
employee to the collective interests of all the employees in the bargaining unit. J.I. Case Co.
v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1944).
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duty of good faith. 01 This would allow the union to work against the
wishes of an individual employee as long as it represented the group. This
reflects a longstanding policy of allowing those chosen as representatives
of employees and employers to exercise freedom of collective bargaining,
and to adopt systems and conditions that suit their particular needs.2 0 2
This freedom to bargain must extend to the creation of seniority systems
because they reflect "not only the give and take of free collective bargain-
ing, but also the specific characteristics of a particular business or
industry."' 0
But there are limitations inherent in Title VII and section 703(h) that
go beyond a mere "good faith" obligation. A union must be aware, from
the outset, of the requirements of Title VII in order to avoid litigation.
"The rights assured by Title VII are not rights which can be bargained
away-either by a union, by an employer, or by both acting in concert."'2"
Title VII requires that minority interests in equal employment opportu-
nity be protected. In fact, the union has a duty to negotiate actively for
nondiscriminatory treatment of its minority workers. 05 The union's duty
is implicit in Title VII because of the liability attaching to unions which
discriminate . 2 0 The American Tobacco Court stated that section 703(h)
reflects the balance between the freedom to bargain collectively, and the
limitations of Title VII.2Y0 Yet difficulties inherent in section 703(h) make
this a blind statement by the Court, especially in light of the fact that
703(h) offers no guidelines for negotiating seniority systems, but merely
protects certain seniority systems from challenge. 08 Without further clar-
ification of section 703(h), the unions and employers will not know if they
are proceeding in an unlawful manner in negotiating seniority provisions.
On the other hand, employees seeking to remedy a discriminatory se-
niority system can attack the collective bargaining representation of the
201 Aaron, supra note 7, at 1534.
202 This was the labor policy when the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed. California Brew-
ers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 608 (1980). See also United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 889 (1979) (a voluntarily adopted affirmative action plan
was permissible).
20 444 U.S. at 608. The Teamsters Court points out that seniority systems differ in the
ways they measure time, depending on the needs of the industry. Further, the legislative
history of § 703(h) does not show a preference for measuring seniority by plant, depart-
ment, job, or lines or progression. 431 U.S. at 355 n.41.
204 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971); accord Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d at 270.
205 Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also
United States v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973).
, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976).
207 456 U.S. at 77.
200 The difficulties in interpreting what is a bona fide system and in determining whether
§ 703(h) extends to post-act systems is a concern for unions in collective bargaining. If a
union does not know which systems are protected by § 703(h), it is not bargaining from a
very strong position.
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union as an alternative litigation strategy. Remedies for discrimination
may be had through revision of the seniority structure."0 9 "If the seniority
system is amended rather than abolished, or if some other form of objec-
tive work allocation is adopted, . . . two labor interests-those of inde-
pendence from the employer and union objectivity-are protected. Only
the accrued seniority expectations of the incumbent white employees are
disturbed. ' 21 0 The fact that the majority's expectations are violated is not
grounds for denying seniority relief to the victims of discrimination. To
do so would "frustrate the central 'make whole' objective of Title VII."2 1
Further, seniority provisions in collective bargaining agreements do not
grant vested property rights in employees.2 112 Seniority rights can be mod-
ified when necessary.
Modification of the seniority system was the relief granted under Title
VII in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Air
Lines.2 "2 The court held that the union could not incorporate into the
collective bargaining agreement seniority provisions which deterred mi-
norities from transferring into other departments.2 4 The court ordered
the airline to use company-wide seniority for purposes of layoff and re-
call, and departmental seniority for other purposes. 21 The union asserted
that this relief trammeled collective bargaining rights, but the court dis-
agreed. Relying upon Franks, the court stated, "[I]t is well settled that
seniority systems in collective bargaining agreements may be modified to
provide relief under Title VII. '216
This reasoning would have been appropriate in American Tobacco be-
cause the lines-of-progression seniority plan acted as a deterrent to trans-
fer. This type of remedy does not destroy collective bargaining rights, but
merely sets limits on that freedom. "Company seniority is a common de-
nominator which treats all employees fairly regardless of past alleged dis-
'0, Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 376 U.S. 169 (1964) (returning veterans were allowed
to have the seniority they would have earned had they not served in the military); Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976) (retroactive seniority awarded to victims of
discrimination).
'" Cooper & Sobol, supra note 9, at 1605. "Were it not for the prior exclusion of black
workers, an incumbent white employee might not even have obtained employment, much
less acquired substantial promotional expectancies." Id. at 1605-06.
"" 424 U.S. at 774.
112 Id. at 779. See also United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1341 n.37 (5th Cir.
1980); Vogler v. McCarthy, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1971); Marinelli, Seniority Systems
and Title VII, 14 AKRON L. REV. 253 (1980).
... 560 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
"" Id. at 229-30. This decision addressed gender-based discrimination as well as race
discrimination.
"i Id. at 233.
216 Id. at 234. See also EEOC v. AT & T, Co., 556 F.2d 167, 178-79 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); United States v. International Union of Elevator Constructors,
Local Union No. 5, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976).
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crimination. '"2  If a seniority system is unlawful, then a remedy is neces-
sary, and the fact that the system was collectively bargained-for is not a
legal defense.21 Therefore, seniority systems can be challenged by show-
ing that the collectively bargained-for agreement is unlawful under Title
VII and thus an unenforceable contract.
The American Tobacco decision has given greater freedom to unions
and employees to establish seniority systems on discriminatory terms.
The bargaining process will be undermined as the incentives to eradicate
discrimination no longer exist. There is no sanction left to ensure that the
goals of Title VII are heeded in the process of negotiating seniority sys-
tems because most seniority systems will fall under the 703(h) exemption.
C. Recommendation for Change
In order to clarify the meaning and scope of section 703(h) as it relates
to seniority systems, certain factors must be considered. First, it must be
determined conclusively whether present intent to discriminate is re-
quired in order to prove that a seniority system is unlawful. It should be
sufficient to show a discriminatory effect or disparate impact, brought on
by a prior intent to discriminate. A neutral system which effectively hides
discriminatory motives should not pass muster. Second, a determination
of whether section 703(h) insulates post-Act seniority systems must be
made. To now allow an expansion of the protection of section 703(h) to
post-Act systems ignores the fact that employers have had almost two
decades to rid their job practices of discrimination. Third, a working defi-
nition of "bona fide" is necessary in order to determine which seniority
systems are shielded by the 703(h) exemption. Merely stating that bona
fide seniority systems are protected is too vague, and serves as too great a
barrier for Title VII litigants.
Judging by its recent decisions, the Court may not be the body to clar-
ify section 703(h). The legislature should reconsider the purpose of the
seniority exemption to Title VII. If Congress' findings prove that there
are some seniority systems which still require protection, a suitable
change in the law might read:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a.. . seniority sys-
tem or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by a
quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in
560 F.2d at 235. Cf. Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916, (1982) (collective bargaining agreement incorporated an affirma-
tive action plan which modified existing seniority rights, and the court held that seniority is
merely an economic right which unions may elect to bargain away).
21' Heard v. Mueller Co., 464 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 1972).
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different locations, provided that such differences do not reflect
an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin which may have entered at any stage of the
formation of such system. This section is limited to those sys-
tems in effect prior to the effective date of Title VII and must be
construed in light of the purposes of Title VII.2"
After due consideration of the original need to protect seniority sys-
tems, the legislature may conclude there is no present need to protect
seniority systems. Unions and employers would simply have to ensure
that their seniority systems comply with the affirmative mandates of
Title VII.
VI. CONCLUSION
The shortcomings of section 703(h) are exemplified by the Supreme
Court's decision in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson. The difficulties
with the interpretation of section 703(h) stem from the lack of a defini-
tive legislative history and the language of the subsection itself. Further
difficulties arise because of the Court's failure to read section 703(h) in
light of the affirmative mandates of Title VII. The Court cannot ignore
the basic dictates of Title VII, which attempt to rid private employment
of discrimination.
In order for there to be true equal employment opportunity and the
abolition of discrimination in the work place, employment practices can-
not merely appear neutral while perpetuating discrimination against cer-
tain groups. Employment policies must be explicitly and implicitly
neutral.
In order to avoid further discriminatory practices, the legislature must
either redraft or totally abolish section 703(h). If the choice is to redraft,
the following elements must be considered necessary: 1) that a definition
of "bona fide" be forthcoming; 2) that the seniority exemption be limited
to pre-Act systems; 3) that it be acknowledged that an intent to discrimi-
nate can exist during the development of a system and that there need
not be a present intent; and 4) that section 703(h) be construed in light
of the broad purposes of Title VII. Until these issues are addressed, equal
employment opportunity cannot be a reality.
BETH WAIN BRANDON
1" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) (italicized portions added by author).
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